

## **Which state for the "great leap forward"? Capacities and forms of governance for a transformative agenda in South America**

**Damian Lobos**

*Universidad Nacional de Córdoba - Argentina*

The call for the 2024 Agrarian South Summer School proposes us to reflect on industrialization of rural and city in the current conjuncture. In this sense, considering the dependent and fragmented condition of the national economies of the countries of the Global South, the question arises as to whether it is possible, under current conditions, to develop self-centered processes of expanded capital accumulation. This question transcends the objectives of this text, but it serves as a framework for our focusing proposal: what would or should be the place that the State occupies in this process? What capabilities and instruments do you have to face these challenges? How do the political biases and tendencies of national governments affect this agenda? And how does the turbulent international situation influence this?

In this essay some coordinates will be proposed to address this agenda, specifically considering the States of South America. In this sense, an attempt is made to return to some questions already raised in this network in the publication “Reclaiming the Nation” of 2011. More than a decade has passed since the publication of this transcendental volume, but many of the questions raised there are still valid, regrettably highlighting the current genocide of the Palestinian people.

In the first section are presented situation coordinates of South America. In the second part, conceptual elements on the theory of the State and the specificities of the State in the Global South. In the third section, State capacities and governance models are considered based on the South American experience. It closes with some concluding notes and proposals for an academic and political agenda on the matter.

### **Elements of the South American current situation**

The first half of the 20th century demonstrated in South America the transformative capacity that the state apparatus concentrates in terms of urbanization, industrialization and change in the living conditions of the working class. Although the developmental and import substitution experiences implemented during the postwar period had disparate results and degrees of consolidation, much of the productive apparatus and improvements in the quality of life of working people were obtained in this context.

During the last quarter of the last century, the reforms adhered to the “Washington Consensus” had as one of their nodal aspects the legal-institutional reforms of the States, adopting market or business governance models, opening the instruments of economic regulation to international capital. and liberalizing access to strategic natural resources. The main consequence of these reforms was the limitation of technical capacity and conditionality in the political construction of the State as an agent of social and economic transformation.

The role of States in the economy has fluctuated so far in the 21st century, largely responding to the instabilities of the global crisis of monopoly capitalism and the recent impacts of the pandemic.<sup>1</sup>

During the first decade of the century, the global trend has been an upward trend in public spending in relation to GDP (+20%), due largely to the militaristic advance of the United States in the Middle East, the dynamism acquired by the global financial sector and, by derivative, the raw materials markets. In comparison with global data, in a significant number of countries in the South American sub-region, around the year 2000, “retracted” public administrations were observed, where neoliberal policies of privatization and reduction of public benefits were very severe. In countries where the crisis of neoliberalism at the end of the 90s created the conditions for the emergence of progressive and socialist governments, a significant increase in the national public sector in terms of spending was observed (Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela). Added to this is the case of Colombia, with a very significant increase in its state apparatus, largely due to political alignment with the North American administration of the successive governments of Álvaro Uribe, where public spending grew due to the injection of foreign investment. for internal security policies and reinforcement of military forces in the face of internal war against guerrilla and drug trafficking organizations. In Chile, Peru and Paraguay, the dimensions of their governments were sustained even in a cycle of regional accumulation (derived from the increase in prices of agricultural commodities), preserving the neoliberal model there. For its part, the dollarization of Ecuador implied restrictions on the intervening role of the State.

The experiences of reformist, progressive governments and “21st century socialism” during the first two decades of the 21st century have been disparate in the region, but they have had as a common element their redistributive nature, above any transformative project of the matrix. national productive. Indeed, the economic crisis of neoliberalism became a political and representation crisis, to which these governments responded with various initiatives for universalization and access to basic rights, from which they built varying degrees of political legitimacy. For this reason, after the obscurantism of neoliberal hegemony, the debate on the State in South America during this stage was configured between a vision of redistributive social democracy and the support of the liberal and republican ideology of the minimal state. At this crossroads there has been little room for the emergence of national projects based on productive development, although the dispute for control of strategic natural resources was the order of the day in Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil.

The North American financial crisis of 2008 was expressed in the fall in the price of commodities, the reduction of international credit and the recession of the global economy, which gave rise to the contraction of public administrations. This largely explains the contraction of the relative weight of public spending on global GDP between 2010 and 2018 by -7.6%. In this context, the countries of South America entered into contraction of their national economies, reducing the previous trend of increased spending in Argentina and Colombia, but assuming state compensation through public spending in those countries with more open economies - and for example more vulnerable to the crisis - such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay. In Ecuador, a dollarized economy, such a situation was impossible, given that the foreign exchange necessary to carry out countercyclical policies migrated to the Global North.

This was followed by the health and economic crisis of COVID 19, where isolation and social containment measures promoted a new wave of increased public spending, in this case on a global scale and with a strong presence in the region.

Global geopolitical tensions, intensified by the Ukrainian war and Israel's genocidal advance on the people of Palestine, intensified widespread political instability with few precedents in the democratic cycle of South America. For its part, the advance of monopoly capital brought the fascist right-wing of an important social base to the region. The Bolsonaro governments in Brazil (2019-2023), the coup d'état in Bolivia in 2019 and Milei's recent victory in Argentina are expressions of this. But the generalized crisis was also expressed in opposing manifestations, with the emergence of progressive and revolutionary expressions, mainly in those countries where neoliberal policies were largely rooted in the State. Account of this was the political crisis in Chile, which led to the constitutional reform process first (2020-2023) and the victory of Gabriel Boric in 2022 later, the victory of Gustavo Petro in Colombia in 2022 and the surprising and brief experience of peasant radicalization resulting from the victory of Pedro Castillo in Peru (2021-2022). This last case, together with the resignation of Pedro Lasso in Ecuador, the dismissal of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the political violence sustained in Venezuela for a decade, configure a picture of regional political instability only comparable to the crisis of neoliberalism at the end of the last century.

In this context, the necessary debate on re-industrialization and the return to planning becomes strategic from the conceptual point of view but complex from the practical point of view. Can centralized state planning exist under the current national legal-political conditions in South America? If not, does the current situation make it possible to open a cycle of democratic, constitutional or strategic institutional reforms? On this level, what frameworks of possibility exist for the current internal and external political conditions, in this context that García Linera has called "catastrophic tie"?

## **The question of the State**

Reflection on the intrinsic relationship between the State (and its public administration and government components) and the economy is the foundation of debates on political economy.<sup>2</sup> With the formation and development of mercantilist capitalism starting in the 18th century, the matrix of liberal thought is formed, from which the split of the economy from society is proposed (Polanyi 2011). From the bourgeois ideological sieve of classical liberalism, the market is an institution that emerges naturally from free relations between people, while the State is the institutional condensation of domination - necessary - agreed upon between people.<sup>3</sup> Classical Marxist criticism of political economy has focused on demonstrating the social and political nature of the formation of markets and the intrinsic contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, but to a large extent this dichotomy has been reproduced uncritically.<sup>4</sup>

(Gramsci, expanded state and hegemony)

Where these various dichotomies were definitively and forever broken was in the formation of the "stated world system", based on the independence processes of the global south since the

mid-20th century, which managed to subvert the imperialist dynamics of capital (Moyo and Yeros 2011).

The debate between Miliband and Poulantzas developed in the 1970s prefigured the coordinates of contemporary political thought and action. For the derivationists, following Miliband's thought, the bourgeoisie reproduces its domination and the separation between economy and politics through specific “forms of State”, which are historical forms of organization of class domination. States and all instruments of government (bureaucracy, liberal democracy, regulations, etc.) are “pure means of domination” and their structure are organized solely for that purpose.<sup>5</sup>

For structuralists, the modern State is born and develops in conjunction with the capitalist mode of production, creating the conditions for its dominance. In its primitive form, the role of the State consisted of the creation and reproduction of what Karl Polanyi (2011) called fictitious commodities, namely, work (the wage relationship), currency (means of circulation of commodities) and communal natural resources (land, energy, water, etc.). To these historical functions imposed by the bourgeois classes, the historical development of the capitalist mode of production has caused the State to assume new derived forms, which are external to the class interests of both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, since the class conflict It leads society to confrontations and tensions that put the political-institutional order in check. Given this, the State acts on the class conflict by regulating, conditioning, granting specific frameworks, segmenting and providing incentives and concessions to the various classes and segments. In this way, the State, although it projects order outwards, inwards is a chaotic amalgam of conflict, partial agreements and circumstantial resolutions, which must be processed through specific procedures and areas.

### *Particularities of the State in peripheral social formations*

The structure of the State must be understood as a societal structure whose devices, institutions, relationships and procedures are intended to create, or in most cases project, a specific “order” in concrete social formations.<sup>6</sup> That is, in the face of the chaotic and random sum of processes, agencies, interests and identities that exist materially, the State creates political-material and ideological-discursive conditions to direct, shape, perform and contain social conflict between classes, factions of society. class and groups. It is only under the umbrella of this “state order” that the subsistence of capital and the processes of expanded accumulation are possible.

Social formations are “concrete, organized structures, characterized by a dominant mode of production and the articulation around it of a complex set of modes of production subject to it” (Amin 1974, p. 14). In the Global South, social formations have, regardless of their historical particularities, a general framework in terms of a peripheral economy subjected from their national organization to imperialist domination (Amin 1974, Patnaik and Patnaik 2017). In peripheral capitalist economies, the export hub attracts the vast majority of foreign investments, channels national savings, captures productive developments and controls the various marketing channels and networks.<sup>7</sup> At the opposite extreme, the economic pole dedicated to the internal market, based on the consumption of the popular masses, is moderately or not at all modernized and without regular receipt of productive and financial resources.

The generalized crisis of reproduction, the limited extension of capital and the diverse forms of income of the working class are intrinsic conditions of the internal market phase of peripheral economies, and are deepened by the internationalization of capital. In this sense, in peripheral economies the contradiction between capital and labor is hindered and missed;

“in self-centered economy, there is an organic relationship between both terms of social contradiction: bourgeoisie and proletariat, which are integrated into the same reality, which is the nation. That, on the contrary, in an extraverted economy, this unity of opposites cannot be captured in the national framework” (Amin, 1974, pp. 201-202)

In this framework, how does the State intervene in the reproduction of the specific form that the capitalist mode of production occupies in the Global South? Firstly, creating the conditions of “order” not only between classes and groups, but – and above all – between these two fragmented phases of the economy. In effect, their development being highly conditioned by State intervention, the internal market phase of peripheral economies tend to sustain and preserve protectionist policies of fiscal incentives and sectoral control of the entry of imported products. For their part, those actors and sectors whose production and commercialization are related to foreign trade put pressure on the State due to trade opening, the reduction of relative costs in labor, logistics and productive resources and the deregulation of capital flows. The tensions between both “country projects” largely expose the margins by which national political parties have been forged, making the European left/right cleavage empty categories (Vilas 2010; Cao, Laguado, Duca and Rey 2021).

Existence and government management of this tension resolve or obstruct the class conflict on the national scene. On the contrary, this situation creates a dynamic of dual and polarized proletarianization within the peripheral national economies themselves (Quijano 1970; Nun 1970). On the one hand, those who are directly related to activities and companies dedicated to export have income and working conditions similar or at least close to the proletariat of the central economies. On the other hand, in sectors such as construction or food production for the domestic market, salary-type labor relations are rare, and if they exist, they are degraded in their form and content, assuming very low salary and income levels.

This marginalization of the productive sectors dedicated to the internal market manifests itself in “a set of impoverishment mechanisms,”<sup>8</sup> which configure a subjectivity and political agenda typical of “working people” (Shivji 2021). On this level, aggravated by neoliberal policies and in the context of the organic crisis of capital, both social experiences - progressive and sustained neoliberalism - in the 21st century have as a common element: the development of social containment policies, both monetary (social plans) and non-monetary (access to subsidized credit, housing policies, subsidies for public services, among others).

## Capacities and forms of governance in South America

Now, how does the State, as a power/agent and in terms of structure, make viable the political and economic projects of the different sectors and classes in dispute? Julián Bertranou (2015) defines “state capacity” as the “*ability of state entities to achieve the purposes that have been assigned to them internally or externally*” (p. 39). Responding to the philosophical tradition that the Frankfurt school has called “instrumental reason”, the literature on state capabilities leaves aside the discussion about the content, relevance or desirability of the ends of government



action and focuses on the means of the available from the public administration. There is the assumption that the State is an agent, an actor in a broader framework, which must comply with certain pre-established actions and objectives. From the structuralist Marxist perspective, Bob Jessop (2014; 2019) proposes that the State is a contradictory material unit of agency and structure, in the sense that it is capable of generating societal change (State power), while imposing a certain external order to others social agents (State structure).

We can say then that there are two types of State capabilities:

- The political capacities of the State, consisting of those devices, practices and relationships capable of responding to specific issues arising from sectoral demands, directing societal processes in times of crisis and participating in a relevant way in the construction of social hegemony. This generally responds to what Jessop calls the power of the State, and is directly linked to the forms of governance and the external legitimacy of the apparatuses.
- The organizational or structural capacities of the State, consisting of the specific form of the institutional apparatus, the historically constructed instruments of regulation and intervention and their efficiency and/or effectiveness with respect to economic and social agents. Specific biases and selectivities are reflected in the structure of the State, resulting from the specific trajectories of social formations and the struggle of classes and segments.

The power of the State responds largely to the government in power but, in conflict, the forces in conflict can also directly control it. For its part, the State as a structure reproduces in its practices, institutions and discursivities certain selectivities (primacy of always partial interests) historically constructed by preceding political struggles. In this way, the State as a structure is the guarantor of popular conquests and, at the same time, the condition of possibility of the capitalist mode of production in the long term. The structure-agency dialectic is evident: current struggles are conditioned by the instituted statehood, but it is only through the capture (always circumstantial and temporally limited) of the power of the State that this same structure can be modified in favor of the specific projects in conflict.<sup>9</sup>

Bob Jessop (2019) provides a synthesis of recent debates on transformations in conceptions of state capabilities, generically defining governance as those

“coordination mechanisms and strategies in the face of complex reciprocal interdependence between agents, organizations and operationally autonomous functional systems” (p. 230).

According to this conception, governance is not a specific, concrete and historical form of state action, as it has been conceptualized by Anglo-Saxon political science. On the contrary, there are diverse “modes of governance”, given the diversity of coordination strategies and relationships that the State exercises with its exteriority. The capacity of the State is given by the exercise of governance, always diverse and strategic, that allows it to meet specific political and organizational objectives.

There are 3 modes of governances, related to diverse “institutions”: the State as a bureaucratic-hierarchical model, the market as a model of exchange and commercialization, and “society” as a corporate representation of interests, coordination or network action. To these Jessop

includes a fourth, which he calls “solidarity governance”, emanating from the non-market ties of the working people. For us this addition is valuable, but it can be better understood and acquire dimension from the conceptualization of “community-form” proposed by Álvaro García Linera and the historical experience of the national struggle of the indigenous peoples in South America in the 20th century. Finally, considering the case of China and the independence processes in the 20th century, we will add to these the category of “transformative governance”, on which for the moment we will make only some introductory comments.

The processual succession, emergence and development of forms of governance responds largely to hegemonic struggles and disputes over the role of the State and the legitimacy of its actions. Likewise, it is the historical social experiences and struggles sedimented in the structures, institutions, practices and discourses that give primacy to some of these forms of governance not only in each specific social formation, but also within each statehood (in agencies, ministries, departments, subnational phases or segments of the apparatus).

### *Bureaucratic governance*

In the traditional vision of Max Weber, State capacity depends on autonomy, that is, the degree of independence that its actions have from social and economic vicissitudes and tensions. The attribute of autonomy is obtained through the development of a stable bureaucratic organization, sustained under the legitimacy of the written legal norm. For this perspective, state action must be experienced as the imposition of an external order on society (and therefore the market), which is supported by trained agents who develop routinized technical procedures and individualized response (file). For this, the structure of the State had to be hierarchical, solid, coherent and corporate.

Oscar Ozlack proposed that the formation of States in Latin America involved the constitution of bureaucratic attributes in a process of statehood of society and that included the externalization of power, institutionalization of authority, differentiation of control and internalization of a collective identity. To a large extent, the nonexistence of fractured states in the region responds to the concretion (partial and regionalized, but legitimized on a social scale) of this statehood (Moyo and Yeros 2011).

The formation of nation states in Latin American countries during the 19th century was a tumultuous process, commanded by urban elites with a strong localist profile and without much territorial force beyond their ejidos. The epicenter of the dispute after the withdrawal of colonialist forces was the architecture and formation of the national market, which implied a struggle for power between the sectors organized from the colonial extractivist regime and the emerging local and regional bourgeoisies that were building hegemony. on the peripheries of the previous system.<sup>10</sup>

Regarding the organization of the State structure, the ideological guidelines that guided the independence process in South America were the liberal-enlightenment tradition in general, and in the formation of States, North American republican constitutionalism. This aspect of the European republican tradition proposes a scheme of functional and territorial division of the powers of the State, but with the primacy of the executive power over the rest. This scheme of political organization is reproduced in confederal, federal and even unitary countries. This institutional configuration of state power is top-down and bureaucratic, with important margins

of action for the executive branch (progressive tendency), but with strong and politically relevant control mechanisms by consolidated economic and social groups (conservative tendencies).<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, the fragmentation of State power is an intrinsic characteristic present to this day not only in the federal States of South America, but also in the unitary ones, as is the case of Chile and Peru.<sup>12</sup> The vast majority of public services and government benefits are provided by sub-national and municipal governments, which grants legitimacy and stability to their political elites, to the detriment of what happens with the political groups of the national or federal government. This imposes a localist or regionalist bias in the structure of the State, forcing the construction of consensus with sub-national elites, mostly of conservative tendencies, to make the exercise of State power effective.

Bureaucratic governance was what carried out the industrialization processes during the 20th century in the region. In South America, “traditional planning” refers to the models and policies developed during the 40s and 60s of the 20th century. Two clearly differentiated moments occurred: the hegemony of the import substitution agenda developed by ECLAC, based on long-term policies that combined multi-sector interventions and state control of an important part of the surplus of agricultural exports for the development of new intermediate and heavy industry sectors, and, starting in the 1960s, the influence of short-term so-called “developmental” programs, financed by the United States within the framework of the Alliance for Progress and whose purpose was modernization of the strategic sectors (agriculture).

The “traditional planning” experiences in South America had as particular characteristics a highly bureaucratic governance, with a centralist vision of state action, leadership by technical agents and the sustained purpose of industrialization, particularly urban. In these traditions, absolute control was assumed by the state apparatus not only of the economic and macroeconomic variables, but also of the entire society (housing policies aimed at the redirection of the workforce, massive access to health and education , etc.).

### *Transformative governance*

The early nature of the decolonization of Latin America, and the influence of North American republicanism, had as a historical result that the State structures of South America were already fully constituted in their bureaucratic forms at the beginning of the 20th century. This situation imposed a strong bias on government experiences of industrialization and economic planning in the region, given that although there was a certain influence of the Soviet tradition – particularly around the Cuban revolution in the middle of the century – political projects did not emerge and were developed by revolutionary political movements in the context of decolonization processes (as occurred in Asia and Africa), but through established political parties, with the technical support of highly professionalized international institutions.

Heilmann and Perry (2011) propose that China's “great leap forward” shapes a successful alternative trajectory. In this case, in the middle of the 20th century, a profound process of economic and social reforms guided by the State was established in a context of national liberation struggle with low (and in some regions zero) bureaucratic institutionalism. This transformative governance or “guerrilla style of politics” is characterized by a



“fluid *modus operandi*, based on context, situation and agency: a method of policy generation and implementation based on the acceptance of widespread uncertainty, the willingness to experiment and learn (even from enemies and foreigners), the agility to taking advantage of unforeseen opportunities, the determination to pursue strategic objectives, the willingness to ignore unpleasant side effects”

These coordinates shaped a particular practice of revolutionary governance with transformative tendencies, which persists to a large extent in the current structure of the State. As can be seen, these capacities differ too much from the Weberian bureaucratic model, assuming change and societal symbiosis of agents and interests as part of state dynamics. It is possible to find glimpses of these practices in some South American political processes, such as in the government of Salvador Allende in Chile or in the first Peronism in Argentina. Closer in time, after the crisis of neoliberalism, elements of transformative governance can certainly be identified in the experience of the Bolivarian revolution established at the end of the 1990s in Venezuela (Alves 2013) and in the MAS governments in Bolivia.

### *Corporate governance*

The capabilities of the bureaucratic model of the State to face the challenges of the late 20th century were strongly questioned by neoliberal literature. The State reform project was based not only on a monetarist reading of the crisis of the 1970s, but mainly on an anti-statist conception that understood public administration as a complex amalgam of inefficient bureaucracy (Borón 2011).

In opposition, it was proposed that to address its (restrictive) purposes, the State should adopt modes, forms and values typical of private business management. The “market” as an institution and the rationality of commercial efficiency were prioritized as the models to follow to base the reform of the State, embodied in the region in the so-called “Washington consensus.” The reforms had to transform the practices, purposes and discursivities of the bureaucratic State, bringing them closer to those of the market: quantitative evaluation, displacement of the notion of citizen towards that of client or beneficiaries, public-private alliances as management strategies, the idea of competition between subnational entities and governments and de-hierarchization of government action.

In South America, neoliberal policies were initially implemented by dictatorial governments during the 1970s and 1980s, but later endorsed by democratic governments during transition processes.

Starting in the 1970s, hand in hand with the economic opening policies carried out by dictatorships in various countries in the region, the economic planning agenda disappeared. The 1990s are called “the lost decade of planning,” where the structural reform programs promoted by the Washington consensus directly denied the planning role of the State, while dismantling the main instruments that were implemented decades before (privatization of public companies, deregulation of external flows, among others).

In recent decades, a shift towards the neo-Schumpeterian notion of “public innovation” has been observed from the centers that promote the technocracy of strategic planning, linking administrative reforms (data management, tax payment, business promotion policies) with the

new business strategies derived from the changes that have occurred in telecommunications and the digitalization of processes.

### *Corporate or network governance*

In his classic 1992 text “The State as a Problem and as a Solution,” Peter Evans was interested in studying the problems of implementing the neoliberal agenda of structural adjustment in the countries of the so-called “third world,” in the context of the fall of the communist axis in the West and the emergence of the unipolar world. In his proposal he recovered the relevance of the bureaucratic capabilities of the State, and he proposed that they should be combined with political-consensual capabilities. In order to carry out large-scale reform programs, Evans proposed that the State must be capable of being constructed as a social relationship rooted or embedded in the broader societal framework, which includes the market, culture, identity, ideology, classes, the configuration of social segments and factions, etc. It is from these ties, dialogues and shared exchanges that both legitimacy and the political frameworks for building consensus and authorizations necessary to implement specific programs, policies and agendas are constituted.

In Latin America, the tradition of network or corporate governance had an important impact in the 1990s, and implied a redirection of post-dictatorship neoliberal policies. In the implementation of neoliberal policies, efforts have been made to stress the transformative capacities of the State from both dimensions, relating the government apparatus to the bastions of the market and civil society as alternative foci of political capacity, while maintaining that the actions of the State Developmentalism generated macroeconomic imbalances and limitations in the – efficient – actions of the market. To a large extent, the debate on governance is linked to this first capacity: the State in neoliberalism cannot provide society with answers to its problems, and therefore coordination, particularly with the business sector, is not only desirable, but necessary. .

In this sense, although the relevance of the technical teams formed in the United States - the “Chicago boys” - was maintained, the traditional political parties and sectoral employers' associations acquired centrality and relevance. The reforms should not be a rigid program, but rather a corporate agreement in both its intention, formulation and implementation, even though the responses to this amalgamation of interests did not directly correspond to the guidelines of the Washington consensus. This made viable, for example, either the labor-military pact in Bolivia or the constitutional reform process in Argentina.

After the economic crises of neoliberalism in South America and the emergence of progressive governments during the first decade of the 21st century, various international organizations began to promote “strategic planning” models.<sup>13</sup> These methodologies assume as their purpose access to foreign direct investment from transnational capital, through the development of sectorally and territorially focused policies for the promotion of so-called “strategic” activities and locations, given the existing endowment of resources, capital and labor. The main focus of development in this matter has been the investment through international organizations in large connectivity works and the development of transnational logistics systems, as is the case of IIRSA (Lobos and Frey 2015).

## *Community governance*

In their analysis of the national question of Bolivia, Álvaro García Linera and Raquel Gutiérrez (2009 [1995]) propose that primitive or community forms are the antithesis of capital, but not only in its commercial-mode-of-production matrix. with-wage-work, but also in terms of social and political form. The consolidation of capitalism as a civilizational form consists of the submission of all social and individual forces to the determinations of the law of value, that is, of the value-form. The opposite of globalized and civilizational capitalism (expressed in neoliberal ideological and political hegemony) is the self-determination of communities, as a civilizational form in tension and in constant resistance against the advances of capital.

Although the community form, as a productive form, is the starting point, non-capital is not reduced to material and symbolic production, but to the entire society taking charge of its existence, exercising its self-government. The community transforming the ways of doing, feeling, knowing and connecting; creating social power.<sup>14</sup> That is to say; capitalism is opposed by community, communism being simply a historical synthesis between pre-capitalist and post-capitalist society. For García Linera (2009), the ayllu is a productive, bonding and political community unit, which contains, on the one hand, the otherness of capital, which is required to be exploited (permanent primitive accumulation); and on the other, the germ of the society to come.

But, for this to occur, it is necessary for the community-form to transcend its local character and acquire, bringing up Hegel, a predisposition for totality. As a political project, the ayllu must acquire a universal character and impose itself as a political-civilizational project. In this sense, the objective of the social power of the community is the conquest of the political power of the State. Returning to the Gramscian concept of the “integral State,” García Linera (2010) proposes that the role of the State in a revolutionary process is to lead the social, political, economic, moral and intellectual transformation of society through the promotion of the community.

From this debate the question of plurinationality arises, which implies the diversity of national projects under the same state institutional structure, with which the issue of autonomy comes into discussion, but also of recognition and legitimacy, with the other side of denial, persecution and elimination as a fascist national project. At this point the question of the communal land of the native peoples and the recognition of their forms of authority arises. The constitutional reforms of Bolivia and Ecuador have been advanced in this matter, being the first to recognize and constitute a foundation for the state order from the material condition of plurinationality. This recognizes territorial and legislative autonomy and creates specific representation institutions. In the proposal to reform Chile's constitution, denied by the 2022 referendum, the plurinationality of the State was also recognized, in this case in a context of open conflict between the government and the Mapuche people. Likewise, within the agenda of the discussions of the peace agreements between the government of Colombia and the FARC-EP, the issue of community autonomy was proposed in the section on comprehensive agrarian reform. The conservative reaction was immediate, and to a large extent the various expressions of the extreme right in the region have expressed exclusive nationalist discourses and have assumed the indigenous peoples and communities as enemies.

But even in States where there is no hegemony of exclusive nationalism, the question of community has also gained relevance. In these first decades of the 21st century in Brazil and

Argentina during the Peronist and PT governments, there has been the inclusion of leaders of anti-neoliberal organizations and social movements in various areas of social policies - particularly those dedicated to social action and containment, access to basic rights and community promotion - (Inda 2023). This new “militant professional bureaucracy” has contributed innovative ways to the formulation, management and implementation of public income redistributive policies, particularly based on the territorial adaptation of forms and discourses and the community participation of the beneficiaries. Even so, until now these experiences have been limited to the management of the social emergency, having not impacted the global governance of these States.

## Considerations

The State is the object and place of class demands and organized groups. The working class can influence – and has historically influenced – the structure of the State, expressing demands in government plans and creating social rights through political struggle. To a large extent, the 20th century has been one of great achievements in this sense, both nationally and internationally: reduction of working hours, minimum wage, pension systems, development of public health and education, children's rights, etc. Likewise, during the postwar period, the post-import substitution industrialization policies implemented in the Global South implied a series of conquests and repositioning of the domestic bourgeoisies in the face of imperialist capital. But it is precisely in the conquest of these social and labor rights that the capitalist mode of production has managed to sustain itself in a context of its organic crises. On the contrary, the neoliberal advance since the 1980s has been a global strategy of globalized capitalism of reappropriation of the apparatus and horizons of meaning of the State.

In the structures of the States of South America there are important technical capacities developed in matters of planning, derived from the historical experience of the 20th century and the presence of regional organizations specialized in the matter. This is relevant, but the development of new models and technical instruments with an emancipatory perspective is necessary, to avoid the corporate capture typical of the current hegemony of the public innovation agendas and the conservative selectivities imposed by the strategic planning model. Likewise, so far in the 21st century there has not been a sustained and strong coherence between the policy agendas proposed by the technical devices of strategic planning and the current macro-economic policy decisions. The latter - in particular exchange rate regimes and public spending - exercised in the last two decades as responses to the instabilities of the world economy.

Every political project requires not only a strategy of seizing power, but also a specific strategy of 'taking over the State'. For a “great leap forward” project, it is necessary to contest the State as an agency, that is, to build hegemony from, with and starting from the state apparatus. Anti-statist strategies, deeply rooted in the post-structuralism and post-Marxist tradition in the Global North, are not capable of accounting for the political and economic transformations that are required to build a new international and domestic balance that ends the empire of the capital and the suffering of the great popular masses in the Global South. In this sense, the fragmentation of the dependent economy means that the axis of the political dispute over the State as an agency is expressed in the opposition between internationalist agendas (deregulation, commercial opening, privatizations) vs nationalist agendas (protectionism,

public controls and subsidies). ). Within this abstract generality are the specific trajectories and the degree of disparate development of the productive forces, the concrete forms of organization that the social classes have developed, the autonomous territorial experiences and the political parties and specific alliances. Given the current situation, where the crisis of capitalism is pushing towards fascist expressions and the denial of the State, it is necessary not to stop betting on the unity of the national and popular field, assuming contradictions and making strategic alliances that assume humanitarianism and anti-socialism as principles. -imperialism.

Looking forward in this collective political project it is necessary to express that a government strategy of industrialization planned from the Global South must assumed and developed from a new state one to built. That is, assume the transformation of the structure of the State. Following China's historical experience, it should be flexible, dynamic, open to change and found founded and rooted in societal practice. The latter is very complex to think about from the rigid and consolidated state structures existing in South America, supported by historical republican institutions devoid of popular presence, commercialized ways of doing and constructing politics and with a fragmented and disseminated State power in the territory with strong tendencies towards conservatism. Sustaining this State structure, the only viable option is what largely occurred during the progressive cycle; social policy of containment, without transformation of the structure of the State.

Taking the historical experience of the Washington consensus it becomes necessary to raise the hypothesis of the need to assume a reform of the State as an agenda of the working people of the Global South, which must made explicit in its purposes, instruments and procedures. The performativity of this new statehood should supported by the primacy of transformative, community forms of governance, in the sense of an unstructured relational power dynamic, open to change, situational, and adaptive that is deeply inscribed in one's own conceptions and forms of working people's self-governance. To this must be added specific segments or spaces with a political-institutional configuration of "rooted autonomy", very pertinent to bring together the national bourgeoisie. The latter must be configured as technical strongholds, in order to create legitimacy towards the sectors to be convened.

Notes:

1. See attached table.
2. In his course "What is Economics?" of 1907, Rosa Luxemburg recovers the document "Capitulare de Villis", written by Charlemagne towards the end of the 8th century or the beginning of the 9th century. There she realize that the debate on political economy does not It is only prior to the hegemony of mercantilist liberalism, but in its embryonic forms these reflections were inscribed in the general problem of the political organization of the government. Michael Foucault provides a particularly significant genealogy on the relationship between the classical schools of administration and political economy.
3. In this way, "economic science" was prefigured as the study of the free commercial relations that men exercise among themselves, while the "science of politics or administration" is dedicated to the study of political power, understood as relationships of domination and pressure (institutionalized or not) between men.



4. Marx himself, although with nuances, has adhered to this primary conception repeatedly in his work (as evidenced by the classic architectural metaphor, the reflections on Bonapartism and the historical quote about the State as the “organizing committee of the interests of the dominant classes). However, his reflections on primitive accumulation and the Asian State towards the twilight of its life demonstrate an alternative drift of great relevance (Amin 1974; Castillo 2007).

5. In this way, any stateization of demands, struggles and social processes implies their translation into routinized mechanisms subject to objective and impersonal norms. The procedural bureaucratization of the State implies the capture of popular demand. Being purely oriented and dominated by the capitalist class, the structure of the State is rigid and useless to be used in any other way. That is why a popular emancipatory agenda, for the derivationists, consists not in the seizure of the State, but in the extension and deepening of the popular democratic principle, which in their understanding weakens the rule of the objective norm (State) and therefore of capitalist domination. In this idea, the derivationist tradition is related to the autonomist proposals of operaism and to post-modern and post-Marxist philosophy.

6. Following Samir Amin, “social formations are concrete, organized structures, characterized by a dominant mode of production and the articulation around it of a complex set of modes of production subject to it” (p. 14).

7. This is how in these economies export activities have technological and productivity levels similar to those of central capitalism, but with significantly higher rates of profit, given the relative low level of wages and low-cost access to natural resources and goods. productive. The sectors of the peripheral economies that are mainly inserted in external markets are the primary ones, particularly mining and agriculture. That is to say, the peripheral economies provide raw materials and wage goods to the central economies at values below social reproduction and significantly lower than the costs of the labor force in the central countries.

8. Among which Samir Amin (1974) lists: “proletarianization of small agricultural and artisanal producers, rural semi-proletarianization and impoverishment without proletarianization of peasants organized in peasant communities, urbanization and massive increase in open urban unemployment and underemployment, etc. Likewise, in these sectors underemployment tends to be permanent and grow.” (p. 200)

9. In this text we will focus on the political capacities of the State, only making some comments on the organizational capacities, under the promise of their development in a later text.

10. This process was precisely the opposite of what occurred in the North American States resulting from French (Canada) and English (United States) domination at the end of the 18th century, where their formation involved the integration of diverse regions and groups into a single great federal administrative organization, with preservation of sub-national autonomy. This political model of State was largely the project of Simón Bolívar and San Martín for South America. But in Latin America, the disputes between the leaders and leaders of the non-port regions and the port elites of Buenos Aires and Lima led to the fragmentation of the colonial territories of the viceroyalties into a large number of independent States. The exception to this rule was Brazil, because the characteristics of its independence process from Portuguese colonialism allowed it to inherit the bureaucratic and military apparatus of the Crown from the empire.

11. Conflicts between executive and legislative are current debates in sociological and political science literature in the United States, particularly from the formalist school of rational choice (Moe 1998).

12. Thus; “The trends towards regional autonomy were reinforced by the weakening of the old dynamic axes of the colonial economy (e.g. the centers supplying precious metals) and the growing isolation, which made the development and integration of new economic circuits difficult. The independence period was thus characterized by secessionist tendencies that dismembered the viceroyalties and drastically modified the political map of Latin America.” (p. 22-23)

13. This aspect of the planning school comes mainly from Europe, but has its conceptual roots in North American “public choice,” according to which local governments compete, through the development of promotion and positioning strategies, for the location of capital and labor. The “citizen voters” travel to those cities that best have resources and services in accordance with their preferences.

14. In opposition to post-structuralist perspectives, García Linera (2001) proposes that the crowd-form, unlike the declining union-form and the consolidated community-form, has a sporadic, thematic, regional and discontinuous character, which makes it more of an epiphenomenon of neoliberal policies and, only eventually, a very long-term political project, on which the expectations and dreams of oppressed peoples cannot be sustained.

## Bibliography

- Alves, E. (2013) *Planificación Emancipadora: subversión contra el capital desde la Venezuela bolivariana*. Buenos Aires: Herramienta.
- Amin, S. (1974) *El desarrollo desigual*. Barcelona: Editorial Fontanella.
- Bertranou, J. (2015) Capacidad estatal: Revisión del concepto y algunos ejes de análisis y debate. *Revista Estudios y Políticas Públicas* 4. 37-59.
- Borón, A. (2011) Latin American Thinking on the State and Development: From Statelessness to Statelessness. In *Reclaiming the nation*, eds. Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros: 215-234. New York: Pluto Press.
- Evans, P. (1996) El Estado como problema y como solución. *Revista Desarrollo Económico* 35 (140). 529-559.
- García Linera, Á. (2009 [1995]) *Forma valor y forma comunidad. Aproximación teórico-abstracta a los fundamentos civilizatorios que preceden al Ayllu Universal*, Buenos Aires: CLACSO y Prometo. Disponible en: <http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/coedicion/garcial/>
- García Linera, Á. (2010) “Del Estado aparente al Estado integral. La construcción democrática del socialismo comunitario”, *Discursos y ponencia del vicepresidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia* núm. 8, pp. 7-14.
- Inda, G. (eds.) (2023). *El Estado y sus burocracias: discusiones teóricas y avances de investigación*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Teseopress

- Jessop, B. (2019) El Estado: pasado, presente, futuro. Buenos Aires: Prometeo libros y Universidad Nacional de Quilmes.
- Jessop, B., (2014) El Estado y el poder. Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana 19 (66). 19-35.
- Lobos, D., & Frey, K. (2015) Aproximaciones al rol de los planificadores regionales de la Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA). Revista EURE - Revista De Estudios Urbano Regionales, 41(124). <https://doi.org/10.7764/652>
- Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. (eds.) (2011) Reclaiming the nation. New York: Pluto Press.
- Oszlak, O. (2004) La formación del Estado argentino. Buenos Aires: Ariel Historia.
- Patnaik, U. and Patnaik, P. (2017) A theory of Imperialism. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Perry, E. and Heilmann, P. (2011) Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China. In Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, eds. Elizabeth J. Perry and Sebastian Heilmann: 1-29. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Polanyi, K (2011) La gran transformación. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Shivji, I. (2021) The Concept of 'Working People'. In Labour Questions in the Global South, eds. Jha, P. Chambati, W. and Ossome, L.: 49-62. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

### Public spending as % of GDP

Country Name	2000	2010	2018	2020	Variation 2000-2010	Variation 2010-2018	Variation 2018-2020
<b>Mundo</b>	23,7	28,4	26,3	33,7	20,0%	-7,6%	28,1%
<b>América Latina y el Caribe (BIRF y la AIF)</b>	s/d	s/d	27,8	30,9	s/d	s/d	11,4%
Argentina	16,8	24,6*	22,7	25,9	46,1%	-7,8%	14,0%
Bolivia	20,6	s/d	s/d	s/d	s/d	s/d	s/d
Brasil	s/d	30,7	35,5	38,5	s/d	15,5%	8,5%
Chile	20,1	20,2	22,6	26,2	0,3%	11,9%	15,9%
Colombia	16,9	25,4	30,0	36,6	50,0%	18,0%	22,1%
Ecuador	s/d	34,0**	33,7	32,9	s/d	-0,9%	-2,5%



Perú	18, 4	17,8	19, 9	26, 8	-3,3%	11,6%	34,9%
Paraguay	s/d	11,8	16, 1	18, 5	s/d	36,2%	14,5%
Uruguay	26, 6	28,3	32, 0	34, 6	6,4%	13,2%	8,3%
Venezuela	s/d	s/d	s/d	s/d	s/d	s/d	s/d

\* Data 2014    \*\* Data 2013

**Source:** own elaboration based on World Bank and International Monetary Fund database.