Failed settlers and Panafricanism

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Within this article, I draw on a particular set of themes and forms of conjunctural analysis within this tradition, which we believe are particularly useful in understanding the unique form of neocolonialism present in Southern Africa, the forms of compradorisation of various indigenous classes, and the constraints and potential that these place on economic development, radicalisation and regional integration within the country. In particular, we examine the potential for an alliance to form between indigenous national liberation movements (typically led by the indigenous bourgeois class) and imperial capital, to regulate the forms of autonomous white supremacist development attempted by settler political and economic projects. This creates a unique form of neocolonialism after the defeat of settler rule, which is shaped by the contradictory alliance of pro-imperial and decolonial forces under late settler rule.[1] (Emmanuel 1982).

[1] While some earlier Marxist authors such as Lenin initially saw certain liberatory potential and possible alliances with settler anti-imperialist projects (Emmanuel 1982) particularly with proletarian, peasant and petty bourgeois settler classes. This was heavily critiqued by dependency/world systems and third world theorists (Emmanuel 1982, Sakai 1989)

Introduction

Firstly, this paper is an attempt to understand the developmental and anti-imperialist potential of a range of mediated bourgeois or revisionist projects within Southern Africa. This can then be used to inform whether revolutionary or reformist strategies are most likely to be effective in furthering both regional development and anti-imperialist struggles in the Southern African instance. This choice must be understood in the context of the continued dangers of imperialist occupation and the complete destruction of social formations. Here, it is often useful to understand South Africa's historical trajectory in comparison to a range of other countries, in particular other settler colonies and failed settler colonies, in their ability to avoid imperial interference (both neocolonial and through direct military interference and foreign administration), balkanisation or civil war, and development, anti-imperialist struggle and internal progressive struggles.

Within this analysis, the central focus will be on examining Arghi's hypothesis. Fundamentally, this argues that at a certain point within settler colonies, an alliance may form between indigenous liberation movements and imperial monopoly capital against forms of local settler political formations attempting to create forms of autonomous development. Here, imperial monopoly capital often views indigenous groups as less likely to develop successful autonomous development, which is a major threat to imperial monopoly capital. Indigenous liberation groups may view exploitation by international monopoly capital to be preferable to the outcomes of a successful settler project for autonomous capitalist development, which may have the potential for genocidal violence or other forms of political violence and control, which, in particular instances, international monopoly capital may be less able or less willing to enact. Thus, the neocolonial alliance between indigenous bourgeois forces (and other comprador classes) and international monopoly capital may already be formed before the destruction of settler rule rather than be a product of a latter post-revolutionary sell-out.

Further, this is a slightly less damning viewing of indigenous comprador classes, as this alliance is revealed to be a strategic one against remaining settler political forces. Albeit a compromising alliance for national development, a potentially personally enriching alliance and an alliance formed based on the weakness of indigenous liberation forces to complete a struggle against settler classes on their own for any number of reasons which may have been avoided through better revolutionary practice or different internal class coalitions. Here, an important question for development is whether to try to replace capital with a less embedded foreign imperial capital.

Does the tail wag the dog? A history of Marxist analysis of settlers, capitalism and imperialism.

Setter colonies[2] have long been a subject of detailed dialectical analysis within the scientific socialist tradition. These analyses have focused on the different modes of production present in settler colonies and the social formations which these modes of production combined to form, the forms of class struggle and liberatory potential within these societies, and their relationships to larger regional and world capitalist systems. This academic tradition can be traced back to Marx's writings on America[3] and the differing modes of production in the class dominance of peasant and petty bourgeois elements in the North as opposed to the bourgeois and slaveholding classes in the South. This analysis was extended by the Comintern. Later, it was developed by a range of dependency/world system theorists, most notably Francis Fanon, Emanual Arighi, and Samir Amin. These theorists focused on the changing forms of class struggle and alliances present as a range of settler colonies gained national independence under either settler or indigenous rule, in the post-war (Bandung era) and how this formal independence was mediated within the emerging neocolonial system (Foster, 2025). Finally, there has been a renewed interest in analysis around settler colonialism and its relationship with imperialism in relation to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, the related regional war, and continued support for Israel by the US, other imperialist countries, and a wide range of global South states.

Within this article, we draw on a particular set of themes and forms of conjunctural analysis within this tradition, which we believe are particularly useful in understanding the unique form of neocolonialism present in South Africa, the forms of compradorisation of various indigenous classes, and the constraints and potential that these place on economic development and radicalisation within the country. In particular, we examine the potential for an alliance to form between indigenous national liberation movements (typically led by the indigenous bourgeois class) and imperial capital, to regulate the forms of autonomous white supremacist development attempted by settler political and economic projects. This creates a unique form of neocolonialism after the defeat of settler rule, which is shaped by the contradictory alliance of pro-imperial and decolonial forces under late settler rule.[4] (Emmanuel 1982).

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[2] A range of terminology is employed by different authors, colonies, settler colonies, colonies with settlers, and colonies proper. Although certain authors ascribe very specific meaning to some of these terms (differentiating by the size of settler populations and the relative extermination or exploitation of the indigenous population) the terms are generally used interchangeably

[3] Here I will not examine the probable pre marxist origins of scientific analysis of economic and social formations of settler colonies. While it is worth partially decentering Marx from the scientific socialist tradition, for the sake of gaining a more holistic understanding of the tradition, decentering western, and patriarchal knowledge production and so on, this exercise is beyond the scope of the current work.

[4] While some earlier Marxist authors such as Lenin initially saw certain liberatory potential and possible alliances with settler anti-imperialist projects (Emmanuel 1982) particularly with proletarian, peasant and petty bourgeois settler classes. This was heavily critiqued by dependency/world systems and third world theorists (Emmanuel 1982, Sakai 1989)

Arighi's analysis can be compared with a range of common alternative explanations for the dynamics at play in neocolonial states, with some specific details linked to failed settler colonial instances. Additionally, some of these alternatives may shed light on secondary contradictions which emerge or partial counterexamples, even if Arighi's theory holds as a primary analysis. While overall an uneasy truce between international imperial forces and indigenous neoliberal rule may have emerged in many cases as the dominant form of power, this is certainly not for lack of other important forces and dynamics.

The first is the suggestion of a unified coalition of imperial forces with either no contradictions or extremely muted contradictions. Here, imperial forces from the global North, settlers, indigenous compradorial classes, and new sub-imperial forces, such as China and Russia, all ally in a coordinated project of coordinated plunder. This is, for example, typical of much of Patrick Bond's analysis of many of the failed settler colonies of Southern Africa. This view appears more convincing in conjunctures marked by constrained sovereignty, limited state control by popular classes, and muted inter-imperial conflict. Additionally, it is supported by the is the alliance of various settler and indigenous elements. Some indigenous elements became a compradorial class for more local capitalist interests, more directly tied to settler politics, including local monopoly capital (Emmanuel 1982). In South Africa, this integration has happened in a number of industries, most notably mining. It is also present in South Africa's two governments of national unity. Here, all local struggles are entirely organic and oppose all intersecting capitalists, imperialist interests as a unified whole.

The second alternative places far more weight on domestic indigenous forces. This could appear in a negative view, where capital accumulation is driven by a system of national governance that is tyrannical, totalitarian, or simply kleptocratic. Local resistance is seen as progressive even if aligned with calls for liberation and intervention from imperial forces. This analysis of neocolonial systems is heavily critiqued in the Syrian instance by Ali Kadri (2016).

Alternatively, it may be seen in a positive light as a national liberation movement unbowed by an accommodation with imperial capital. This appears unlikely in the case of the former settler Southern African states, due to the significant concessions made to capital in the form of neoliberal policy, and the relatively low degree of imperial aggression in the form of hybrid and kinetic warfare in the region. Though some key elements exist particularly in the Zimbabwean instance. There is a range of ongoing liberation struggles and the potential for greater radicalisation within national liberation movements (Moyo and Yeros 2011). Numerous local forces oppose a range of forms of subordinate integration into the world capitalist system. These may come as attempts to nationalise key local resources, including land reform. It may also appear with more general anti-imperial solidarities or simply extensive protests against neoliberal austerity. These could include more radical labour elements, some national and indigenous bourgeois elements, more radical professional and academic elements, residual peasant or semi-proletarian communities, and slumdwellers and the lumpen proletariat. This view can also be linked to continued imperial aggression. Though this has subsided from general kinetic conflict

throughout much of the region, that was prevalent, driven by South African subimperialism under the nationalist government. It is more that imperial forces have engaged only in more limited aggression and hybrid war in the region rather than complete cooperation with the neocolonial indigenous forces. Additionally, throughout a range of imperial forces allied more closely with settler projects, showing settler solidarity (Horne 2001), even when the population at large in the global core, and elements of the imperial capitalist class and state, turned against settler projects in the region in significant ways. This includes a range of covert operations as well as the breaking of sanctions, both in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The third frequent analysis is that of inter-imperial rivalry as the dominant force. Historically, this can be seen as the rivalries between British and Dutch imperial forces, and then between the United States and the waning European empires, particularly British and Portuguese. Now it can sometimes be attributed to new imperial or subimperial dominance outside of the global North, commonly by either China or Russia. Here, the question of the exact foreign relations of domestic comprador classes also becomes important. While inter-imperialist rivalries have been contained within the post-war era, we increasingly face an era of growing multipolarity, where, as Nkrumah points out, dependent countries may shift to new cores even if they are not internally constituted in such a way that they may become truly economically independent (Nkrumah 1965).

In what instances are revisionist or reformist strategies against national (indigenous) bourgeois rule appropriate, given the specific conditions of the Third World countries?

Before moving forward further with an analysis of the neocolonial conditions of failed settler colonial states in particular, it is important to contextualise these in discussions of neocolonialism more generally. In this paper, I aim to draw on a particular tradition of Marxist and Third World theory, which has a certain ambivalence to national bourgeois projects in the Global South. This tradition is typified by authors such as Amin, Moyo, Kadri, Ajl, and Yeros. This tradition has great admiration for existing political projects which moved (even if only temporarily) beyond bourgeois rule. However, they see both the developmental anti-imperial and anti-settler potential as well as the contradictions and compadorisation of national bourgeois projects. Although this is a wide collection of authors, with no doubt a range of contradictory opinions. They represent a relatively unified academic tradition within scientific socialist thought. Their understanding of national bourgeois global South projects contains the following key ideas, which I would like to develop in my analysis of the South African case.

The first major concern shared by many of these authors is the way in which domestic class compromise may act as a bulwark against more direct forms of imperial or settler violence. Here, while neocolonial conditions and compradorial leadership are condemned, they are seen as only a partial counterrevolution against successful struggles for national liberation. Rather than being considered as more refined, efficient and dangerous tools of imperial domination. Additionally, they are understood

to be capable, at least in some capacity, of participating in a national defence against more overt forms of imperialism or settler occupation. A particular danger this may be counterposed with is that direct class conflict may lead not to a victory of the popular class against the national bourgeois forces, in certain cases, but rather to mutual destruction, creating an instance of national weakness for direct outside involvement (Gramsci, 2020).

Directly related to this point, it is clear that Western imperial powers have often tried to reduce even compradorial independent states to sites of direct occupation and accumulation by destruction (Kadri 2023). One prescient modern example is the American war against Iraq which it had allied with in previous conflicts. Additionally, Yeros (2025) makes a similar claim about the current FRELIMO government in Mozambique. There is also the direct threat of settler violence, which can often be distinct from imperial violence and represents an even more genocidal threat towards indigenous populations, discussed in more detail below.

A related issue is the degree to which local bourgeois rule may act as a type of appeasement to imperial or settler capital. Obviously, as pointed out above, imperial states have no particular aversion to attacking formally allied comprador regimes. However, often counter-revolution forms a priority for imperial violence. This is due to the particular dangers which successful revolutionary examples may pose for imperial systems of accumulation. Thus, while maintaining national bourgeois rule may not help maintain stable non-aggression from imperial forces, it may prevent the allocation of stretched imperial enforcement capacity away from a particular national project towards more immediate threats or priorities.

The second major feature of these authors is a detailed understanding of the contradictions of these states. Ali Kadri explains how initial progressive coalitions in a range of Arab states, due to the bourgeois nature of the ruling coalition, gave in to defeatism and adopted a range of neoliberal policies (Kadri 2016). This then further undermined any popular support, undermining the remaining potential for anti-imperialism such states may possess. The growing social contradiction of bourgeois rule also generally weakens some of their potential for anti-imperial struggle, firstly in any ability to show solidarity and regional unity in struggle and eventually can compromise even their ability to defend national sovereignty.

The third important feature is the potential that these states may at times possess to harness developmental projects. This may often be driven by a state bourgeois project (sometimes military in nature) rather than a more disorganised, less state-centred bourgeois project. However, in both cases, there are important instances where key developmental objectives can be achieved under bourgeois rule (even if pressured from below through militant reformist, but not ultimately revolutionary struggles) may result in drastic and developmental change. Here we may look, for example, at the range of land reforms carried out by bourgeois states, such as Zimbabwe (Moyo and Yeros 2011) and a range of arab states. This is in line with Gramsci's understanding of progressive elements of certain types of Caesarism (as opposed to Marx's analysis of Bonapartism, which is only a more specific regressive instance of what Gramsci attempts to understand as a more general case).

The final feature is a dual understanding of revolutionary movements in these states. The understanding of the potential for counter-revolution, the dangers of opening up countries to outside aggression, and, in particular, the role of imperial forces in driving superficial organic indigenous revolution is frequently understood under the label of "colour revolutions". However, one cannot condemn as counterrevolutionary all internal class struggles waged in the face of imperial or outside aggression. Russia faced severe imperial aggression soon after (and even during their revolutionary struggle). China underwent a revolution while facing Japanese occupation. More generally, all third-world countries stand at risk of imperial interference, yet they represent the sites where the most important forms of revolutionary struggle appear as future potentials. This is a critical judgment which must be based on both local balances of power (the strength and organisation, and strategic capabilities of local revolutionary forces) and on conjunctural analysis. Where popular class organisation is weak, the local bourgeois is strong and international bourgeois forces are well poised for intervention, then open class war may present a greater risk of opening up conditions for more successful and damaging imperial aggression.

An important detail when considering the potential developmental paths accessible with a less compradorial bourgeois is the extent of hybrid warfare faced by many countries attempting more sovereign development projects. Sanctions have been used extensively against a range of countries. Although superficially these are sometimes portrayed as targeted, they often have the effect of slowing or reversing development in many poor countries and increasing the hardship faced by many people. Media operations are also very important in their ability to undermine attempts at sovereign development. Intelligence operations, coups, arming of dissident groups, etc, are also important factors.

There are other traditions within Marxism, both more critical and more enthusiastic about national bourgeois projects in third-world states. (In fact, for the authors I have listed above, no doubt many parts of their work, if read in isolation, may reflect one side more strongly than the ambivalence I describe). While both these traditions contain many respectable Marxist and anti-imperialist scholars, and no doubt contain many useful insights, a substantial engagement with them is a monumental undertaking well beyond the scope of this article.

On the class formations of racial capitalism in failed settler states.

Additionally, settler society itself should not be understood to be a unified class interest. Settler capital often may have greater alignment with international monopoly capital than other settler classes, such as petty bourgeois, managerial and labour aristocracy. This can be due to a number of factors. Firstly, it may be easier for settler capital to integrate its accumulation strategies into a wider global system, such as by listing on international stock exchanges, whereas the participation of other settler classes in global systems of accumulation is more difficult. Secondly, the two may be at odds over the role of non-settler

labour, particularly, more skilled labour. Settler capital release on general settler violence and political control for the social reproduction of cheapened and disciplined indigenous labour power. However, conflict can emerge between them and other settler classes regarding the amount and quality of non-settler labour hired.

Race within settler colonial social formations is obviously a complex and nuanced topic, while economic discussions of it and statistics related to it rarely are. The racialisation of subjects within these states may often vary. Marginalised emigrant groups may find themselves assimilated into dominant racial groups within settler societies. Despite settler attempts at racial purity, this was never truly enforceable. Additionally, numerous immigrant groups arrived, which were never truly adopted into settler society but may have at times had certain privileges or poorer conditions than indigenous groups. Here, the dominant considerations are migration from the Indian subcontinent to African settler colonies. Migration within Africa from labour reserves to more developed settler colonies, and migration from Africa to Latin America.

In settler states, particularly those with large indigenous populations and at potential risk of losing political control to indigenous forces, the distinction between indigenous and settler forms central political, racial, economic and social categories, however much such indigeneity may be denied at times within settler discourse. However, as social formations emerge from the collapse of settler political rule, the question of its role as a primary contradiction emerges. This is a material rather than a theoretical question as it depends on the ability of settler populations to maintain more limited forms of political control, such as local governance, economic control and other forms of institutional control, such as the judiciary. It also depends on how much new political formations are rooted in conceptions of indigeneity, such as land reforms, recognition of traditional leadership, and appeals of non-traditional leadership to indigeneity to ensure popularity or legitimacy.

Often, the indigeneity of ingenious groups is denied through different racial categorisation from settler groups, focusing on precolonial migrations such as the southern Bantu migration, or mythical Palestinian migration from other Arab regions and the displacement or biblical Jewish kingdom; however, indigeneity, along with claims of nationhood and national liberation, form central organising principles for liberation (Ajl 2024). This concept exists principle in the context of occupied societies to refer to all elements of the precolonial society. It can form a useful analytical tool as well as a way to understand. Attention is drawn to class distinctions as well as varying degrees of capitalist incorporation within indigenous societies.

Political struggles organised under the concepts of indigeneity contain overlapping but somewhat distinct claims to political and economic rights to those of national liberation and involve varying strategies for anti-imperialist resistance.

Indigenous struggles tend to focus on returning or protecting precolonial rights, including both ownership rights, user rights, or simply some level of financial compensation for these rights being infringed and some level of economic participation in economic development, which occurs through the exploitation of these resources. Organisation typically tends to be organised without a clear focus on

the eventual realisation of a sovereign nation state. Alliances with other indigenous groups in successful settler colonies tend to be emphasised.

On the other hand, national liberation has often focused extensively on the formation of a nation-state, its use as a tool for economic development. Additionally, organising strategies have typically focused on the party form. Alliances with other nations tend to play a large role.

Both can interact simultaneously; often, minority groups within new nation-states can develop a politics of indigeneity by analogy to groups in successful colonies. Even when dominant ethnic groups have long formed historical relationships to certain areas, where these groups have focused on the political and economic rights presented by the development of productive force through the nation state and integration into the world, capitalist economic minority groups often see their direct rights to resource use and ownership challenged.

However, without trivialising the violence, political and economic oppression faced by minority groups by other local forces, it is unhelpful to view this as a direct analogy to the integration of indigenous groups into capitalist development in successful colonies, even when precolonial or postcolonial conquest has happened, such as in the case of Southward Bantu migration.

It is important to understand the class composition of the various resistance movements against settler rule, which resulted in its overthrow. In some cases, movements have been centred around bourgeois and petty bourgeois interests, in others, there has been a larger proletarian involvement, while others have been dominated by peasant revolt. This has generally resulted in more or less complete forms of decolonisation, meaning both the destruction of settler rule and economic dominance as well as ongoing forms of neo-colonialism from core countries.

As discussed by Samir Amin, struggles for national liberation may contain numerous different class characteristics which often determine their revolutionary ability, their developmental ability and their potential to resist forms of neocolonial rule even when they have achieved formal political power.

In South Africa, the question of national unity has been an overdetermining factor in class and policy formation. In pre-apartheid South Africa, formal distinctions to national unity existed with racially segregated areas and proxy bantustans. Nevertheless, these formal distinctions did not arrest the developing forms of national state building and growing integration of different South African communities and economic integration within the nation. Thus, South Africa has maintained constant borders, without civil wars or partial collapse to separatist forces for over a century. Presenting an illusion of a relatively stable national question when viewed from the perspective of maintaining control over territory and sovereign rule of the territory.

However, in the post apartheid era, this unity has been maintained through a set of compromises which have potentially jeopardised development and redistribution. Firstly, the incorporation of settlers into the new democratic South Africa has involved the delayed and compromised implementation of a range of redistributive policies. Secondly, there has been the incorporation of a range of indigenous leadership structures into the nation, legitimising forms of indigenous leadership and land distribution which

resulted from compromises with previous colonial regimes. Finally, the ANC has created significant political space for multiethnic black leadership, creating a unifying political force, for all that its internal politics may sometimes be upset by underlying ethnic divisions.

Settler separatist forces currently appear only as relatively fringe forces, but this could be bolstered by radicalisation of the state regime, more aggressive redistributive policy, and rising political instability.

Another important difference in the two modes of resistance is the importance of integration within the modern nation-states formed in failed settler colonies of a range of different linguistic groups, previous pre-colonial or colonial polities, remaining settler communities and non-settler migrants. This understanding of the nation emerges as a relatively modern capitalist development involving the formation of common economic life, languages, cultural institutions and so on, rather than in an unchanging ethnic notion of a nation based on supposed precolonial tribal differences.

Labour

It is important to examine the role of two additional subclasses of labour within these failed settler colonies. That of professional, skilled and managerial labour.

Managerial labour often exists in its own form, which is more antagonistic to general labour concerns due to its conflictual role in production. In addition, in the settler colonial context, managerial practices regarding indigenous or other racialised labour often employed forms of racialised violence and humiliation. In precarious settler states, such violence may become ever more vicious. Within the failed settler state, there are legal and formal attempts to eliminate this and general social concern about its continuation, even where highly unequal relations still exist, forms of explicitly racial, violent and derogatory management practices are subdued.

Indigenous and non-settler migrant managerial classes often began to emerge before formal transitions to power, as demographic and economic forces created an increasing demand and supply of managerial labour below the wages of the settler working population. In South Africa, this can be formally seen through the continual raising of the colour bar.

In the failed settler states, the new indigenous managerial class has made significant progress. Often, this progress emerges further in the state than in the private sector. It can even involve the cooption of union and political leaders struggling against the precarious settler colony. Violent and degrading forms of exercising management control may persist, such as high levels of gender based violence within workplaces, and here the managerial class presumably play a pivotal role. In addition to the private sector, access to this class is frequently struggled over on university campuses as struggle to attain relevant qualifications.

Many of the same features are true of the professional class, such as engineering associated with the industrial and agricultural production. However, a major challenge is posed in terms of passing on working knowledge of the systems from the settler to indigenous classes. The result is that productive capabilities may be lost in the transition. Sometimes, settler state employees may be replaced, only to be

rehired at higher rates through contracting when it becomes clear that indigenous professional classes have not been given the requisite knowledge. Examples can be seen in both South African water and electrical infrastructure, including the construction of Madupi and Kusile.

Issues relating to the indigenous professional classes may often be exaggerated and conjunctural, but must be analysed in greater detail. Narrow economism and corruption, poor educational standards and technical capabilities, and a continuation of patriarchal cultures.

Pink-collar professional classes form a different way of integrating into the economy. This includes various professions involved in education and healthcare. This sector has been taken over to a larger extent due to more stringent forms of affirmative action and a greater role for the state in employment. Settler populations remain deeply embittered about the role of significant quotas in these professions. There are significant divides within the class between the public and private sectors. Additionally, the public sector provides highly unequal levels of service provision, employment conditions, organisation and consciousness, between different institutions servicing different income groups, and spatially distributed. There are strong rural-urban disparities, differences between regions such as former homelands, and differences where stronger vestiges of the settler project remain, such as Cape Town and the Western Cape. Austerity has had a major impact on the employment and career prospects of some workers.

Working with vulnerable communities, in institutions that have functioned for decades under capacity, can result in formations of strong class consciousness, and in certain cases, strong international ties, where they are accompanied by many international health care workers. For example, there is a strong history of radical ideoglocal development in Baragwaneth Hospital.

Additionally, these class frequently forms a diaspora or migrant class. This leads to direct class interests in assuring ease and security of migration through positive international relations with the imperial core. These classes often send back significant remittances.

The slow disappearance of settler professional, managerial and petty bourgeois classes and their political betrayal by settler and international capitalist classes, who eventually give up on the continued viability of settler rule and legal economic privilege. This weakening often results in emigration and political disengagement of settlers. This leaves settler capital to engage with the state on its own terms outside of the strength of the class collaborationist settler alliance. This is often the cause of the compradorisation of this class.

Was there a settler attempt at sovereign development?

Coming back to Arighi's hypothesis the we first examine the developing contradictions between the settler project in the region and imperial interests, looking at instances of attempted sovereign settler development and how these shaped regional integration and splitting.

Here we arrive at a range of questions about the region at different points of settler and imperial conflict. It is important to understand the scale of the conflict and how it ever reached a determined role in comparison to the conflict with more indigenous forces. It is also key not only to centre different factions of capital but also a range of other settler and indigenous classes, as in underdeveloped capitalist systems, these may be determining in a number of aspects.

One key point to examine here is the multiple wars for independence of white settler states and the struggles for independence. In South Africa, there were clear struggles for settler independence, first in the Great Trek of 1836, partially motivated by concerns about British attempts to limit slavery in the Cape Colony. This was followed by the two Boer wars, 1880 to 1881 and 1899 to 1902. After this came nominal independence in 1910, full formal independence in 1931, and the election of the National Party in 1948, which marked a greater separation from British power. Rhodesian Independence came in 1965, again showing a struggle with imperial interests.

There was a very significant attempt at independent settler development in Southern Africa, culminating in semi-autarchic industrialisation under sanctions towards the end of the apartheid era. In this era, the government had delinked from global monopoly capital in a number of key fields. A large range of industries emerged in South Africa, these were skewed towards heavy industry related to the mineral energy complex; however, it extended into a wide range of light manufacturing. A complex and independent financial system emerged under the nationalist government, including the formation and integration of a range of Afrikaner financial institutions with a range of former British institutions. This was supplemented by a range of government-owned companies in key productive/strategic sectors of the economy, Eskom, Iscor, Transnet, Sasol and Armscor. This included substantial domestic food production, there was significant land use for cereal production for domestic markets, and key inputs such as chemical fertilisers were produced domestically. Attempts at energy independence include Eskom's large coal fleets as well as Sasol's attempts to produce liquid fuel domestically from coal in order to limit the constraints of sanctions. Additionally, there was a significant domestic arms industry. A significant university system which was closely linked to a range of domestic industries, including mining, mineral beneficiation and arms manufacturing.

However, it is important not to overestimate the amount of delinking that actually took place under the nationalist system. Firstly, although formal superficial sanctions were applied, they were evaded in a number of ways and large imperial interests remained invested in the settler South African project. Secondly, the sustainability of some delinking attempts is highly questionable as the economic performance of the late apartheid government worsened considerably.

Was there an alliance between international capital and indigenous liberation forces?

A second question in Arighi's theory is the temporary alliance between international capital and the indigenous liberation force. Here we can find an abundance of critiques of the ANC, ZANU-PF,

SWAPO, and FRELIMO from a branch of the left, detailing their collaboration with imperial interests (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). This is demonstrated on several grounds: austerity in state welfare programmes; continued reliance on extractive industries with little beneficiation; land grabs and the maintenance of capitalist agrarian relations; and the embourgeoisement of domestic state elites and the violent repression of a range of domestic forces which are seen as carrying more authentic anti-imperial potential. Additionally, these liberation projects were linked to a range of support from international actors, such as China, the USSR and Cuba, each of which exists in their own uneasy and sometimes compromised relationship with Western powers.

In South Africa it can be seen in this can be seen in a range of neoliberal policies such as: the full delay or reneging on radical economic policies such as land redistribution and nationalisation of mineral extraction; privatisation of a range of state owned companies and rapid trade and financial liberalisation, including the opening up of the Johannesburg Stoke Exchange and allowing a range of domestic companies to list on international stock exchanges; as well as limited expansion of the welfare and tax state and acceptance of a relatively restrictive fiscal and monetary policy range.

The history of international sanctions against Rhodesia, even if poorly enforced, showed at least a degree of imperial conflict with settler interests (Horne 2001). Additionally, some links existed between British and American funders and intelligence agencies and ZANU-PF largely in an effort to deter the indigenous liberation movement from greater communist leanings (Moore 2005).

In Mozambique, there is a particular focus on gas exploration and extraction.

In all these cases, it is also important to determine what national forces may have accepted this alliance, or at least a truce with imperial capital. Is it simply domestic compadre bourgeois classes or do elements of labour, the professional managerial classes and wealthier peasants, at times assess the dangers of radicalisation, class suicide and the risk of imperial backlash as sufficient deterents?

As Yeros Writes

> “It does not matter that all the national liberation parties in the region fell into the clutches of neoliberalism. In fact, the region’s independence itself was conditioned on the acceptance of economic opening, facilitated at that time by the fall of the Soviet Union. The “pact” of neocolonial transition was a “pact” of neoliberal transition in a phase of general war fatigue and changes in the relation of forces on a global scale. Of course, much can be said about the internal constitution and ideological commitments of the liberation movements, whose official grammar in all these cases was Marxism-Leninism. Embourgeoisement eventually found its way. However, such an analysis cannot ignore imperialism, which mobilized its forces installed in the region to wage a general war lasting thirty years, followed by civil wars. Its objective remains the same today: to remove, one by one, the liberation parties that still have an organic relationship with the liberation struggles and, above all, to dismantle the mutual defense pact established in 2003, which seeks to shield the region (the Southern African Development Community,

SADC) from military interference. This is the concrete reality of Southern Africa in the twenty-first century. (Yeros 2021)

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